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Abstract—The dependence of modern societies on electric
energy is ever increasing by the emergence of smart cities and
electric vehicles. This is while unprecedented number of cyber-
physical hazards are threatening the integrity and availability of
the power grid on a daily basis. On one hand, physical integrity
of power systems is under threat by more frequent natural
disasters and intentional attacks. On the other hand, the cyber
vulnerability of power grids is on the rise by the emergence of
smart grid technologies. This underlines an imminent need for
the modeling and examination of power grid vulnerabilities to
cyber-physical attacks. This paper examines the vulnerability of
the communication-assisted protection schemes like permissive
overreaching transfer trip (POTT) to cyberattacks using a
co-simulation platform. The simulation results show that the
transient angle stability of power systems can be jeopardized by
cyberattacks on the communication-assisted protection schemes.
To address this vulnerability two physical solutions including the
deployment of communication channel redundancy, and a more
advanced communicated-assisted protection scheme, i.e. DCUB,
are considered and tested. The proposed solutions address the
vulnerability of the communication-assisted protection schemes
to distributed denial of service attack to some extent. Yet,
the simulation results show the vulnerability of the proposed
solutions to sophisticated cyberattacks like false data injection
attacks. This highlights the need for the development of cyber-
based solutions for communication channel monitoring.
Index Terms—Cyber-physical systems, power system re-
silience, co-simulation platforms, communicated-assisted protec-
tion schemes, transient angle stability.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE modern society and its vital infrastructures such aswater supply, communication system, health system and
public security depend on electricity. This dependence is ever
increasing as the transportation system also becomes depen-
dent on reliable power supply by the emergence of electric
vehicles. Accordingly, the large area, long duration electricity
outages can disrupt the functioning of critical infrastructure
services and throw society into chaos and distress. This may
result in billions of dollars of societal and economical costs
and damages as well as the possibility of loss of lives [1], [2].
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In this environment, the increased energy demands, aging
legacy transmission and distribution assets, and increasing rate
of natural disasters such as hurricanes, ice storms and floods
are threatening the reliability and resiliency of the electricity
grid. The many high-profile electric-service interruptions that
have occurred due to natural disasters such as Super-storm
Sandy, and hurricane Katrina are testaments to ever increasing
vulnerabilities of electricity grid [3], [4]. At the same time,
there is a soaring risk of intentional physical attacks on elec-
tricity infrastructures. This is while, the proliferation of smart
grid related technologies is also expected to expand cyber
vulnerabilities of power grids through increased connectivity
and remote access points [5]–[7]. The physical attacks on
substation transformers in California [8] and cyber-attacks
on the Ukrainian power grid [9], [10] are prime examples
of cyber-physical attacks on power grids in recent years. In
addition, the possibility of a joint cyber-physical attack is
a growing concern in modern societies, where an attacker
may seek to identify and exploit power grid vulnerabilities
to obtain self benefits or boost political interests [11]. The
concerns about the vulnerability of power systems to cyber-
physical threats have been reflected in several publications by
governmental and non-govermental organizations [12]–[14].
For instance, the need for the protection of critical cyber assets
in power systems have been recongnized by North American
Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Critical Infrastructure
Protection (CIP) through standard 002-009 [15].
To address these ever-increasing vulnerabilities, utility man-
agers, investors and other stakeholders are developing strate-
gies to reduce the costly large area, long duration electricity
interruptions. These strategies include programs to address
potential cyber vulnerabilities, fortify and expand existing
cyber-physical infrastructure, improve asset management and
introduce automation strategies [16]–[18]. For instance, several
North American utilities have initiated investment programs to
bring together academia, private technology companies, and
government defense agencies and motivate research and devel-
opment in cyber-physical security area [19]. Nevertheless, such
tasks can be daunting considering the size and complexity of
the electricity grid and limited resources available for research
and development programs. Another challenge is the diversity
of power system vulnerabilities and the wide-variety of poten-
tial failures that can happen due to these vulnerabilities. The
difficulty in quantifying the consequences of potential failures
in terms of magnitude and duration of electricity interruptions
as well as the number and type of affected customers and
businesses is another restraining factor. Therefore, there is
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a pressing need for co-simulation platforms and testbeds
with the ability to model and simulate various cyber-physical
vulnerabilities of power systems. The co-simulation platforms
and testbeds will facilitate the identification and protection of
power system critical functions and assets whose failure may
result in catastrophic consequences [20].
The cyber-physical vulnerabilities of power systems have
been the subject of extensive research in recent years [21].
The cyberattacks on power system state estimation have been
examined in [22]–[24], and potential solutions provided. In
[25]–[27] various attacks targeting the stability of power
systems have been studied. The role of protection schemes
in cyber security risk analysis has been studied in [28] from
power system operations point of view. The development of a
cyber-resilient line current differential relay has been presented
in [29].
Several co-simulation platforms have also been developed
over the past decade to bridge the gap between power sys-
tem and communication simulation tools and study cyber-
physical aspects of power systems [20]. A co-simulation
platform based on PSCAD/EMTDC electromagnetic transient
simulator, the PSLF electromechanical transient simulator, and
the communication Network Simulator 2 (NS2) has been
presented in [30]. A co-simulation platform based on RINSE
and PowerWorld has been employed in [31] to study the
vulnerability of the network client to a distributed denial
of service attack. In [32], an integrated platform for power
and communication systems co-simulation is described and
implemented. The virtual control system environment (VCSE)
is proposed in [20], [33] for studying cyber threats on sys-
tem infrastructures. A testbed based on Riverbed Modeler
and PowerWorld has been employed in [34] for analyzing
security of SCADA control systems. A testbed consisting of
control center EMS, substations and external link has been
presented in [35] for intrusion detection and defense against
cyberattacks. A testbed for SCADA vulnerability assessment
has been developed in [36]. In [37], a real-time co-simulation
platform using OPAL-RT and OPNET has been presented for
analyzing smart grid performance. The available co-simulation
platforms reviewed in [38] and a PowerCyber testbed has been
presented for evaluating the impact of cyberattacks on voltage
and rotor angle stability. This is while to the best of our
knowledge, no prior work has investigated the vulnerability of
communication-assisted protection schemes to cyber-physical
attacks. The cyber-physical attacks targeting communication-
assisted protection schemes are of high importance since they
target power systems in the most vulnerable state.
This paper investigates the vulnerability of the
communication-assisted protection schemes like permissible
overreaching transfer trip (POTT) to cyberattacks using a
cosimulation platform based on OPAL-RT real-time simulator
and Riverbed Modeler. Two potential physical solutions
including communication channel redundancy and a more
advanced protection scheme, i.e. directional comparison
unblocking scheme (DCUB), are considered and tested to
address the vulnerability of the POTT protection scheme to
cyberattacks. Although the proposed physical solutions are
resilient to distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack to
some extent, they are vulnerable to false data injection (FDI)
attack. This vulnerability highlights the need for developing
cyber-based solutions for communication channel monitoring.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows.
• The notion of cyber-physical attacks on communication-
assisted protection schemes is demonstrated using a co-
simulation platform based on OPAL-RT real-time simu-
lator and Riverbed Modeler.
• The potential physical solutions for addressing the cyber-
physical attacks targeting POTT protection scheme is
presented and their vulnerability to false data injection
attacks is revealed.
• The importance of co-simulation platforms in developing
cyber-based solutions for communication channels mon-
itoring is revealed and highlighted.
The reader should note that despite the distinct features of the
co-simulation platform presented in this paper, we do not claim
the development of the co-simulation platform using OPAL-RT
real-time simulator and Riverbed Modeler as a contribution.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II provides the necessary background about power system
transient angle stability and communication-assisted protection
schemes. The cyber-phyiscal attacks targeting communication-
assisted protection schemes and the potential physical solu-
tions for addressing these attacks are further discussed. The
co-simulation platform based on OPAL-RT real-time simulator
and Riverbed Modeler is presented in Section III. The vulner-
ability of the power system stability to cyber-physical attacks
targeting POTT protection schemes is uncovered in Section IV
using the co-simulation platform. Moreover, the ability of the
physical solutions for addressing the vulnerability of the POTT
protection scheme to DDoS attacks is demonstrated. Yet, it is
shown that the proposed physical solutions are vulnerable to
FDI attacks. Finally, the conclusions of the paper are drawn
in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND
A power system fault should be cleared quickly enough such
that the fault-on transient remains inside the stability boundary
and power system maintains stability. Power systems with
small transient stability margins may benefit from communi-
cation networks to reduce the fault clearing time and prevent
transient instability. This is because the speed of information
transfer using communication networks is much faster than
power system instability propagation. Communication-assisted
protection scheme is a particular type of the power system
protection that relies on communication networks to reduce
fault clearing time and prevent instability.
Power system stability margins have been declining over
the past decade due to power system restructuring, and the
integration of renewable energy resources. The limited in-
vestments in transmission lines caused by more strict envi-
ronmental constraints have further exacerbated the existing
stability problems. In this environment, protection schemes
have been under constant pressure to operate more quickly
and reliably to counteract transient stability dynamics and
avoid wide area blackouts. For instance, failure to isolate a
faulted line near generating units in a timely fashion can
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cause prolonged unbalance between mechanical and electrical
output of generators and lead to transient angle instability.
Additionally, clearing faults as quickly as possible is always
favorable since it reduces potential damages to critical assets
like transformers.
The need for high speed and reliable protection devices
has promoted communication-assisted protection schemes as
a prominent solution for addressing transient angle stability
problems. The deployment of communication-assisted pro-
tection schemes can result in significant reductions in the
clearing time of faults and disturbances compared to other
protection schemes. Nevertheless, the complete reliance on
communication-assisted protection schemes increases the pos-
sibility and consequences of cyber-physical attacks on these
protection schemes.
A. Transient angle Stability
Transient angle stability is concerned with the ability of a
power system to settle down to a stable steady state operating
point after it is subjected to a fault for a certain duration
of time [39], [40]. The transient angle stability analysis is
commonly performed by means of numerical integration of a
set of differential and algebraic equations (DAEs) describing
power system dynamics. An alternative approach to numerical
transient angle stability analysis is direct methods. Direct
methods refer to the analytical approaches used to calculate
power system stability margin and the associated fault clearing
time [40].
The maximum duration that a fault can remain on a power
system without causing instability is called critical clearing
time. If the critical clearing time is exceeded, the generators
will lose synchronism. In this situation, protection system
will remove the generator from the system to avoid damage
to the rotor shaft. Therefore, an attacker can cause a severe
disturbance or even a blackout in power systems by creating
a fault on a transmission line close to a power plant and
prolonging the fault clearing time beyond the critical clearing
time. The same scenario happens when a cyber intruder
disables the communication channel of the communication-
assisted protection schemes when a fault has occurred due
to natural disasters such as hurricanes or thunder storms.
This is a legitimate concern in particular at locations where
communication-assisted protection schemes are indispensable
for reducing the fault clearing time and preventing instability.
An attacker can use both numerical and analytical methods
to calculate the stability margin and critical clearing time
of a power system and target protection schemes whose
misoperation results in instability. This is an interesting and
relevant topic which is out of the scope of this paper. This topic
will be pursued as an important next step by the authors.
B. Communication-Assisted Protection Schemes
The objective of communication-assisted protection is to
provide high-speed tripping from both ends of a protected line
for faults along the entire line segment [41]–[43]. Multizone
distance protection (commonly referred to as step-distance
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Fig. 1. The POTT protection scheme.
line-end faults since relays on the protected line are time
coordinated with relays on remote lines [42], [43]. High-
speed clearing is desirable and may even be required for the
following reasons: i) to reduce the duration of a fault on a
power system and thereby reduce the likelihood of power
system instability; ii) to enable protection coordination in step-
distance applications involving two adjacent lines with signif-
icantly different lengths; and iii) for power quality purposes
to reduce the duration of voltage sag caused by a fault.
Communication-assisted protection achieves high-speed
fault clearing through communication between line terminals.
Each line terminal communicates its status as a bit of data
to the remote end(s) over a communication channel. In some
schemes, this bit represents a signal which tells the other side
that it has permission to trip (permissive). In other schemes,
the bit prevents the other end from tripping (block). There
are many variations of communication-assisted protection; the
most prevalent schemes include: 1) permissive overreaching
transfer trip (POTT), 2) permissive underreaching transfer
trip (PUTT), 3) direct transfer trip (DTT), direct underreach-
ing transfer trip (DUTT), directional comparison blocking
(DCB), and directional comparison unblocking (DCUB) [41]–
[43]. This paper focuses on the POTT scheme. Yet, the
proposed co-simulation platform can be extended to study
other communication-assisted protection schemes without the
loss of generality. Moreover, the cyber-physical vulnerabilities
demonstrated in this paper for POTT scheme exist in other
communication assisted protection schemes as well.
Fig. 1 illustrates the basic logic of the POTT protection
scheme based on distance relay zone 2 elements. The POTT
protection scheme trips the circuit breaker at each end of a
protected line immediately after receiving the overreaching
zone 2 signals from both terminals of a line. In other words,
the POTT logic allows the local overreaching zone 2 signal
to trip the circuit breaker of the protected line instantaneously
upon the receipt of the permissive trip signal, i.e., overreaching
zone 2 signal, from the remote end of the line. The permissive
trip signal from the remote end of the protected line is
communicated through a communication channel. By contrast,
under steps-distance protection the overreaching zone 2 has to
wait typically 15 to 30 cycles after picking up a fault before
tripping the breaker [42], [43]; this time delay may be large
enough to cause system instability.
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C. Cyber-physical Attacks targeting Communication-Assisted
Protection Schemes
The power grid is a cyber-physical system consisting of
information and communication technologies (cyber assets)
and power delivery components such as generators, transmis-
sion lines and loads (physical assets). Here, the physical-to-
cyber bridge is at sensors that convert physical signals to data
(information) and the cyber-to-physical bridge is at actuation
whereby information is used to make changes to the power
system operations; common forms of actuation include control
and protection.
Cyberattacks are unwanted actions applied to target cyber
assets that exploit a vulnerability; their impacts are measured
in terms of their effects on information. In contrast, cyber-
physical attacks typically aim to exploit vulnerabilities in cyber
assets (in the form of a cyberattack) to cause disruption in tar-
get physical assets such as generators and transmission lines.
They also can involve coordinating cyberattacks with physical
disruptions such as faults to maximize negative impacts on
power systems. Cyber-physical attacks are often measured in
terms of their physical impacts; hence co-simulation represents
an ideal framework in which to model the application of
cyberattacks and describe its physical impacts.
Cyberattacks target information confidentiality, integrity or
availability (C-I-A). The C-I-A paradigm is a rich framework
employed for general cybersecurity studies whereby availabil-
ity and integrity represent the most important cyber security
services for power grid operations because information must
be both accessible in a timely manner and accurate for critical
use in operational settings. Cyberattacks on availability and
integrity are known as distributed denial of service (DDoS)
and false data injection (FDI), respectively.
Communication-assisted protection schemes represent
cyber-physical assets in which communications facilitates
more responsive breaker action. Hence, attacking the
associated communication channel when breaker action is
very much needed can cause significant power grid disruption.
Cyber-physical attacks of communication-assisted protection
may be applied, say, after a physical fault (caused naturally
or otherwise) has occurred. The cyber-physical attack could,
for example, apply either a DDoS or FDI to prolong the fault
clearing time at critical transmission lines by either disabling
the communication channel between distance relays through
say packet flooding (for DDoS) or by providing incorrect
permissive trip signals (FDI). Possible physical impacts
include instability and blackout.
Execution of DDoS or FDI requires that a device with
access to the relay communication channels be corrupt. This
could occur through malware that has propagated into a
component of the transceiver or by physically introducing a
new communication device that can access the channel. For
DDoS the corrupt entity could flood the network with packets
making permissive trip communications impossible. For FDI,
the corrupt entity can insert fabricated permissive trip signals
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Fig. 2. The POTT protection scheme with communication channel redun-
dancy.
D. Physical Solutions to Cyber Attacks Targeting
Communication-Assisted Protection Schemes
Solutions to address cyber-physical attacks can take both cy-
ber and physical forms. Cyber solutions, as typically defined,
involve employing existing cyber assets for mitigation of the
impacts of cyberattacks. Cyber solutions can include the mod-
ification of communication protocols, transceiver operation or
the application of cryptographic primitives on data. Whereas
physical solutions entail actions on the part of physical assets
for mitigation. Physical solutions can also include the addition
of redundant physical infrastructure (including communication
channels).
Cyber solutions are most appropriately applied when there
are sophisticated information and communication systems in
place to enable complex information processing or communi-
cation network reconfiguration. For the application focus of
this paper, communication-assisted protection, such cyber so-
lutions are not feasible. Hence, we focus on physical solutions.
Two physical solutions are considered in this paper for
addressing the cyber-attacks targeting communication-assisted
protection schemes like POTT. The first physical solution
is based on communication channel redundancy. The POTT
protection scheme with communication channel redundancy
is illustrated in Fig 2. Channel redundancy is an effective way
to provide resilience to system operation and its advantages in
communication-assisted protection schemes is studied in this
paper. Communication redundancy increases an attackers level
of required effort often beyond available resources.
The second physical solution is based on considering a
more complex protection scheme, i.e., directional comparison
unblocking (DCUB) scheme. Accounting for possible loss
of a communication channel is imperative for overall POTT
operation. The DCUB protection scheme is similar to the
POTT protection scheme in that they both share information
about overreaching zone 2 pickup signal through a com-
munication channel. The difference is that DCUB scheme
permits fast tripping when the communication channel is lost.
In DCUB scheme distance relays initiate a timer in case




















Distance relay2 overreaching zone2
Distance relay1 overreaching zone2
Protected line
R: Distance Relay
VT: Voltage Transformer CT: Current TransformerCB: Circuit Breaker
XMTR: Transmitter


























































Fig. 3. The DCUB protection scheme.
relays to trip the breaker faster provided their overreaching
zone 2 elements still see the fault. After certain time elapses,
distance relay tripping with overreaching zone 2 pickup signal
is blocked to prepare for the next fault incident.
Fig. 3 illustrates the basic logic of the DCUB protection
scheme. As illustrated in Fig. 3, the DCUB protection scheme
consists of two AND gates and one OR gate. The AND1
gate operates when the communication channel is lost and the
local overreaching zone 2 signal is present. It is noteworthy
that the communication channel status is 0 when the channel
is operational and becomes 1 when the channel is lost. The
AND2 gate implements a logic similar to the POTT protection
scheme where the permissive trip signal i.e. the overreaching
zone 2 signal from the remote end of the protected line is
communicated through a communication channel. Thus, the
DCUB protection scheme allows fast circuit breaker tripping
in two cases; 1) The communication channel has been lost
and the local overreaching zone 2 pickup signal is present
i.e. the AND1 gate in Fig. 3, 2) The communication channel
is operational and the POTT logic of the DCUB protection
operates i.e. the AND2 gate in Fig. 3.
III. CO-SIMULATION PLATFORM
The main objective of the real-time co-simulation plat-
form presented here is to provide the ability to simulate
both cyber and physical parts of a communication-assisted
protection scheme like POTT for a benchmark test system.
The co-simulation platform is of immense importance since
cyber-physical attacks on communication-assisted protection
schemes involve both electrical and communication parts of
an electric system. The OPAL-RT real-time simulator and
Riverbed Modeler are integrated together to create such a co-
simulation platform. Riverbed Modeler is a flexible communi-
cation networking simulator that models a variety of protocols,
technologies and network types and provides a sophisticated
development environment to develop proprietary protocols,
evaluated enhancements to standards-based protocols and tech-
nologies, and demonstrate design in a realistic environment.
The OPAL-RT real-time simulator provides the interface
with a communication simulator such as Riverbed Modeler
through its input/output (I/O) modules and Ethernet ports.


































































































































































Fig. 5. Schematic representation of the implementation of the benchmark test
system in the cosimulator.
61850 protocols such as generic object oriented substation
event (GOOSE) and sampled value (SV) [44]. The IEC 61850
GOOSE protocol is used for fast event driven messaging
while IEC 61850 SV protocol is used for the transmission
of analog values such as current and voltage. In this paper,
the IEC 61850 GOOSE protocol is employed to communi-
cate information between OPAL-RT real-time simulator and
Riverbed Modeler. The IEC 61850 GOOSE packets generated
by the OPAL-RT real-time simulator is embedded in Ethernet
frames with source and destination address fields containing
the medium access control (MAC) addresses of the communi-
cating nodes. The network interface cards enable the GOOSE
traffic exchange between OPAL-RT real-time simulator and
Riverbed Modeler. The publisher and subscriber traffic be-
tween the two simulators is separated using two Ethernet
switches and cables as illustrated in Fig. 4. The system-
in-the-loop (SITL) feature of the Riverbed Modeler permits
the real-time simulation. The SITL publisher and subscriber
ports provide the interface between Riverbed Modeler and
hardware/software applications such as OPAL-RT real-time
simulator.
A benchmark test system involving distance relays and
POTT protection scheme is implemented in the OPAL-RT
real-time simulator. The distance relays issue permissive trip
signals, i.e., overreaching zone 2 pickup signals, whenever a
6
fault occurs in the zone 2 of the distance relays. The OPAL-
RT real-time simulator generates IEC 61850 GOOSE packets
containing the permissive trip signals through its I/O module
and sends them toward Riverbed Modeler using the interface
network cards. The SITL publisher ports in the Riverbed
Modeler receive the real GOOSE packets from the network
interface card of the Riverbed Modeler machine. SITL pub-
lisher ports then convert the real GOOSE packets to simulated
GOOSE packets and send them to the communication network
model implemented in the Riverbed Modeler using SITL links.
The communication network model implemented in Riverbed
Modeler consists of two router switches and a SITL link which
connects the router switches. Each of the router switches
represents the substation gateway at one end of the protected
line and the SITL link between the router switches represents
the communication channel. The IEC 61850 GOOSE packets
enter the SITL subscriber ports through a SITL link after
passing through the network model. The SITL subscriber
ports convert the simulated GOOSE packets to real GOOSE
packets and deliver them to the network interface card of the
Riverbed Modeler machine. The OPAL-RT real-time simulator
receives the IEC 61850 GOOSE packets from the network
interface cards and delivers them to the POTT protection
scheme. The implementation of the benchmark test system
in the cosimulator is schematically shown in Fig. 5.
In Fig. 5, the SITL publisher port1 in Riverbed Modeler
receives the IEC 61850 GOOSE packets generated by the
publisher I/O1 in OPAL-RT real-time simulator and delivers
it to the SITL subscriber port2 through the router switches
and the SITL link. The SITL subscriber port2 in Riverbed
Modeler then sends the IEC 61850 GOOSE packets toward
the subscriber I/O2 in OPAL-RT real-time simulator. Similarly,
the SITL publisher port2 in Riverbed Modeler receives the
IEC 61850 GOOSE packets generated by the publisher I/O2
in OPAL-RT real-time simulator and delivers it to the SITL
subscriber port1 through the router switches and SITL link.
The SITL subscriber port1 in Riverbed Modeler then sends
the IEC 61850 GOOSE packets toward the subscriber I/O1 in
OPAL-RT real-time simulator.
It is noteworthy that the physical attack i.e., fault caused
by intentional or unintentional factors on the electric grid
is simulated in the OPAL-RT real-time simulator and the
cyberattacks i.e., DDoS and FDI attacks are simulated in the
Riverbed Modeler.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
Fig. 6 illustrates the IEEE power system relaying committee
(PSRC) D6 benchmark test system [45], [46]. The benchmark
test system consists of a 500kV transmission system connect-
ing four identical 400MVA synchronous generators to the rest
of the grid. The rest of the grid is modeled by a 230kV ideal
voltage source. All the circuit breakers in the benchmark test
system except the circuit breaker CB10 are initially closed
as illustrated in Fig. 6. The power flows from G1-G4 to S1
through the transmission lines L1-L4.
Five case studies are considered here. The objective of
the case studies I and II is to demonstrate the need for
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Fig. 7. Part of the IEEE PSRC D6 benchmark test system illustrating a
permanent three-phase-to-ground fault on line L1.
transient rotor angle stability of the generators G1-G4 when a
fault occurs. The transmission lines L1-L4 of the benchmark
test system are protected by step-distance protection in case
study I and by POTT protection in case study II. Case study III
demonstrates the vulnerability of the POTT protection scheme
to DDoS attack. Case study IV investigates the DDoS attack on
the POTT protection with communication channel redundancy.
Case study V examines both DDoS and FDI attacks on DCUB
protection and underlines the need for the development of
cyber-based solutions for communication channel monitoring.
In the case studies, a permanent three-phase-to-ground mid-
line fault occurs at t = 0.2 s on line L1 of the benchmark test
system as illustrated in Fig. 7. The location of the fault is at
82% of the transmission line from bus A which is within zone
2 of the protection relay 1 (R1) and zone 1 of the protection
relay 2 (R2). The reach of zone 1 and 2 of the distance relays
are respectively set at 80% and 120% of the transmission lines.
The zones 1 and 2 of the distance relays are forward zones.
Zone 1 is instantaneous, while backup zone 2 has a time delay
of 30 cycles i.e. 0.5 s.
A. Case Study I: Simulating the IEEE PSRC D6 Test System
under Step-Distance Protection
In this case study, transmission lines L1-L4 are protected
by step-distance relays. As illustrated in Fig. 8 (b), the step-
distance relay 2 (R2) sees the fault in zone 1 and 2 (21G Z1
PKP, and 21G Z2 PKP) and instantaneously issues 21G Z1
trip signal to the circuit breaker CB2. The opening of the
circuit breaker CB2 disconnects the transmission line L1 from
bus B. However, the fault does not get isolated instantaneously
7
















Fig. 8. Step-distance relay signals and circuit breakers state of (a) Relay 1
and CB1 and (b) Relay 2 and CB2.









Rotor speed of the generating unit G1
Fig. 9. The rotor speed of the generating unit G1 when the permanent three-
phase-to-ground fault at 82% of the line L1 is cleared after 30 cycles.
because the step-distance relay 1 (R1) sees the fault in zone
2 (21G Z2 PKP) which has the time delay of 30 cycles
before issuing the 21G Z2 Trip to the circuit breaker CB1 as
illustrated in Fig. 8 (a). Within this time delay, the transmission
line L1 remains connected to the bus A, and the generators
G1-G4 continue to feed the fault. As illustrated in Fig. 9
for the generating unit G1, the rotor speed of the generating
units continues to increase and the generators eventually lose
synchronism. This is because the fault clearing time is longer
than the critical clearing time of the generators. This instability
problem can be resolved by clearing the fault from both
ends of the transmission line L1 more quickly through a
communication-assisted protection such as POTT. In practice,
the over speed protection of the generator trips the unit when
the rotor speed exceeds a certain limit typically 1.1 per unit.
Nevertheless, this protection has not been modeled in this
paper.
B. Case Study II: Simulating the IEEE PSRC D6 Test System
under POTT Protection
In this case study, transmission lines L1-L4 are protected
by POTT protection scheme. The successful operation of the
POTT protection scheme requires the receipt of the permissive
trip signal (PTS), i.e. overreaching zone 2 signal, from the
remote relay and the presence of the overreaching zone 2
signal (21G Z2 PKP) at the local relay. As illustrated in
Fig. 10 (a), relay 1 sees the fault in zone 2 and sends the
permissive trip signal (PTS TX in blue) to relay 2. Similarly,
relay 2 sees the fault in zone 2 and sends the permissive trip
signal (PTS TX in green) to relay 1 as illustrated in Fig. 10
(b). The POTT protection scheme receives the permissive trip
signals (PTS RCV) from the remote relay and instantaneously
issues permissive overreaching transfer trip signals (POTT)
to the circuit breakers CB1 and CB2. The opening of the


















Fig. 10. POTT protection signals and circuit breakers state of (a) Relay 1
and CB1 and (b) Relay 2 and CB2.









Rotor speed of the generating unit G1
Fig. 11. The rotor speed of the generating unit G1 when the permanent
three-phase-to-ground fault at 82% of the line L1 is cleared instantaneously.
circuit breakers CB1 and CB2 disconnects the transmission
line L1 from the buses A and B and instantaneously clears
the faults. As illustrated in Fig. 11 for the generating unit G1,
the generators’ rotor speed remains stable in this case.
C. Case Study III: Simulating DDoS Attack on POTT Protec-
tion
In this case study, transmission lines L1-L4 are protected by
POTT protection scheme. The DDoS attack is implemented in
Riverbed Modeler as illustrated in Fig. 12 to disable the com-
munication channel between distance relays R1 and R2. The
CyberEffects tool in Riverbed Modeler is used to implement
the DDoS attack. The DDoS attack execution involves two
phases; 1) infection, and 2) flooding. In order to implement
the infection and flooding phases, two workstation nodes i.e.
attacker and receiver are required as illustrated in Fig. 12.
The attacker workstation is required to infect the workstation
nodes in the network i.e. nodes 1-5 and execute the flooding
phase of the DDoS attack. The IP address of the receiver node
is required by the CyberEffects tool to define the destination
node of the packets generated by the DDoS attack. The traffic
generated by the DDoS attack towards the receiver workstation
node overflows the router switch1 in Fig. 12 and causes the
denial of service.
As illustrated in Fig. 13 (a), relay 1 sees the fault in
zone 2 (21G Z2 PKP) and sends the permissive trip signal
(PTS TX in blue) to relay 2. Moreover, relay 2 sees the
fault both in zone 1 and 2 (21G Z1 PKP and 21G Z2 PKP)
and sends the permissive trip signal (PTS TX in green) to
the relay 1 as illustrated in Fig. 13 (b). Nevertheless, the
permissive trip signals get blocked by the DDoS attack and
do not reach the respective remote relay. The relay 2 (R2)



































































Fig. 12. The DDoS attack implemented in Riverbed Modeler on the
communication channel between distance relays.






















Fig. 13. POTT protection signals and circuit breakers state of (a) Relay 1
and CB1 and (b) Relay 2 and CB2 considering the DDoS attack.
CB2 as illustrated in Fig. 13 (b) because it sees the fault in
zone 1 (21G Z1 PKP). This is while the relay 1 (R1) waits for
30 cycles before issuing the 21G Z2 trip signal to the circuit
breaker CB1 as illustrated in Fig. 13 (a). This is because relay
1 does not receive the permissive trip signal (PTS RCV) from
the relay 2. Thus, the generators lose synchronism in this case
similar to Case Study I.
D. Case Study IV: Simulating DDoS Attack on POTT Protec-
tion with Communication Channel Redundancy
In this case study, transmission lines L1-L4 are protected
by POTT protection scheme with communication channel
redundancy (see the logic of the POTT protection with com-
munication channel redundancy in Fig. 2). Fig. 14 illustrates
the implementation of the communication channel redundancy
in the Riverbed Modeler. As shown in Fig. 14, two sets of
SITL subscriber and publisher ports are implemented for each
substation. The SITL publisher/subscriber ports in Riverbed
Modeler communicate with the publisher/subscriber ports of
their respective relays in OPAL-RT real-time simulator shown
in Fig. 15.
Two scenarios are considered here. In the first scenario, the
DDoS attack is implemented to disable the communication
channel1 between the relays R1 and R2. As illustrated in
Fig. 16 (a) and (b), both relays see the fault in zone 2 (21G Z2
PKP) and send the permissive trip signals (PTS TX1 and
PTS TX2) through the communication channels to the remote
relay. The POTT protection does not receive the permissive trip
signals (PTS RCV1) through the communication channel1.































































































































Fig. 14. The implementation of the communication channel redundancy









































PTS: Permissive Trip SignalR: Distance Relay
CB: Circuit BreakerCT: Current Transformer
VT: Voltage Transformer
Publ./Subs.: Publisher/Subscriber
Fig. 15. Schematic representation of the implementation of the POTT
protection with communication redundancy in OPAL-RT real-time simulator.
signals (PTS RCV2) through the communication channel2
and instantaneously issues permissive overreaching transfer
trip signals (POTT) to the circuit breakers CB1 and CB2.
The opening of the circuit breakers CB1 and CB2 isolates
the transmission line L1 and instantaneously clears the fault.
Therefore, the generators remain stable in this case similar to
Case Study II.
In the second scenario, both communication channels are
disabled by the DDoS attack. As illustrated in Fig. 17 (a) and
(b) both relays see the fault in zone 2 (21G Z2 PKP) and send
the permissive trip signals (PTS TX1 and PTS TX2) to the
remote relay. However, the POTT protection does not receive
the permissive trip signals (PTS RCV1 and PTS RCV2) due
to the DDoS attack on both communication channels and
fails to open the circuit breaker CB1. The relay 2 (R2)
instantaneously trips the circuit breaker CB2 because it sees
the fault in zone 1 (21G Z1 PKP) as illustrated in Fig. 17 (b).
This is while the relay 1 waits for 30 cycles before tripping the






















Fig. 16. POTT protection with communication channel redundancy signals
and circuit breakers state considering the DDoS attack on the communication
channel1 (a) Relay 1 and CB1, (b) Relay 2 and CB2.
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Fig. 17. POTT protection with communication channel redundancy signals
and circuit breakers state of (a) Relay 1 and CB1 and (b) Relay 2 and CB2














Fig. 18. The logic employed to identify communication channel loss.
circuit breaker CB1 as illustrated in Fig. 17 (a). This is because
relay 1 sees the fault in zone 2 (21G Z2 PKP) and does not
receive the permissive trip signal from relay 2 (PTS TX1 and
PTS TX2). Thus, the generators lose synchronism in this case
similar to Case Study I.
It is noteworthy that cyberattackers require more resources
to attack two communication channels in the case of com-
munication channel redundancy compared to the case with a
single communication channel. Thus, communication channel
redundancy reduces the risk of successful cyberattacks against
the communication-assisted protection schemes because the
required resources in this case are often beyond available
resources of cyberattackers.
E. Case Study V: Simulating DDoS and FDI Attacks on DCUB
Protection
This case study investigates the performance of DCUB pro-
tection under cyberattack. In order to identify communication
channel status the logic shown in Fig. 18 is implemented in the
co-simulation platform. As illustrated in Fig. 18, the original
signal and its inverted value are sent over the communication
channel. When the communication channel is operational, the
output of the OR gate is always one and the output of the
NOT gate on the right hand side of Fig. 18 is zero. This is
because one of the signals entering the OR gate is always
one. In contrast, when the communication channel is lost, the
output of the OR gate becomes zero and the output of the NOT
gate becomes one. This is because both signals entering the
OR gate become zero when the communication channel is lost.
Thus, it is possible to identify the status of the communication
channel using the logic shown in Fig. 18.
Two scenarios are considered here. In the first scenario,
the DDoS attack is implemented in Riverbed Modeler as
illustrated in Fig. 12 to disable the communication channel
between the relays R1 and R2. The study starts from a condi-
tion where the DDoS attack on the communication channel has
been in progress. As illustrated in Fig. 19 (a) and (b), both






















Fig. 19. DCUB protection signals and circuit breakers state of (a) Relay

















































































Fig. 20. The FDI attack implemented using Wireshark tool and Riverbed
Modeler.
relays see the fault in zone 2 (21G Z2 PKP) and send the
permissive trip signals (PTS TX) through the communication
channel to the remote relay. As illustrated in Fig. 19, the
DCUB protection does not receive the permissive trip signals
(PTS RCV) because of the DDoS attack. Nevertheless, the
DCUB protection identifies the communication channel loss
(Ch Status). The DCUB protection issues the DCUB trip
signals (DCUB Trip) to the circuit breakers CB1 and CB2
because the local overreaching zone 2 signal (21G Z2 PKP)
is present and communication channel is lost (see DCUB
protection logic in Fig. 3). The opening of the circuit breakers
CB1 and CB2 isolates the transmission line L1 and clears
the fault. Therefore, the generators remain stable in this case
similar to case study II.
In the second scenario, the FDI attack is implemented
on the communication channel between the relays 1 and 2.
In order to implement the FDI attack in the co-simulation
environment, the Wireshark tool is employed. Wireshark tool
is an open source software which is able to monitor, and
save communication packets. First, the OPAL-RT real-time
simulator is employed to generate GOOSE packets containing
false GOOSE packets indicating that the overreaching zone 2
signal is not present. The Wireshark tool is then employed to
save the false GOOSE packets. Afterwards, the benchmark test
system is simulated and the false GOOSE packets are injected
into the communication channel between the relays 1 and 2
using the Wireshark tool as illustrated in Fig. 20.
As illustrated in Fig. 21 (a) and (b) both relays see the
fault in zone 2 (21G Z2 PKP) and send the permissive
trip signals (PTS TX) to the remote relay. Nevertheless, the
attacker replaces the original GOOSE packets containing the
10


























Fig. 21. DCUB protection signals and circuit breakers state of (a) Relay
1 and CB1 and (b) Relay 2 and CB2 considering the FDI attack on the
communication channel.
permissive trip signals with false GOOSE packets indicating
no permissive trip signals (PTS RCV). Moreover, the com-
munication channel status (Ch Status) is operational in this
case. Therefore, DCUB protection does not issue DCUB trip
signals (DCUB Trip). The distance relay 2 sees the fault in
zone 1 (21G Z1 PKP) and instantaneously issues 21G Z1 trip
signal to the circuit breaker CB2 as illustrated in Fig. 21 (b).
This is while the distance relay 1 (R1) waits for 30 cycles
before issuing the 21G Z2 trip signal to the circuit breaker
CB1 as illustrated in Fig. 21 (a). Thus, the generators lose
synchronism in this case similar to Case Study I. This case
study highlights the vulnerability of the DCUB protection
scheme to FDI attacks and the need for the development of
cyber-based solutions for communication channel monitoring
in the communication-assisted protection schemes.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper demonstrated the vulnerability of
communication-assisted protection schemes like permissible
overreaching transfer trip to cyber-physical attacks. Moreover,
it is demonstrated that this vulnerability can be exploited
to destabilize the power system and potentially create
cascading failures. The simulation studies performed using
a co-simulation platform based on OPAL-RT real-time
simulator and Riverbed Modeler. A case study is employed
to demonstrate that a cyber intruder can disable the
communication channel between two distance relays at
critical times using the distributed denial of service attack
and destabilize the power system. Two physical solutions
including communication channel redundancy and a more
complicated protection scheme i.e., directional comparison
unblocking protection scheme are employed for addressing
the vulnerability of the POTT protection scheme to DDoS
attacks. Although these physical solutions can be employed
to address the DDoS attacks to some extent, they are still
vulnerable to false data injection attacks. This highlights the
importance of co-simulation platforms in developing cyber-
based solutions for communication channels monitoring. This
topic will be pursued in our future research.
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in 2016. He was a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Denver in 2017.
Currently, he is a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Toronto.
He was a research and development engineer with ITA-UIS Company,
Dubai, United Arab Emirates, from 2008 to 2010. His research interests are
in the fields of power system modeling, cyberphysical security, reliability,
economics and optimization of power systems.
Anthony Kemmeugne is currently a PhD student at the University of Toronto
in the department of electrical and computer engineering. He received his
engineering degree in France in Telecommunication and Electronics from
Telecom Saint-Etienne, in 2018. He received his M.Sc degree in Electrical
and Computer Engineering from UQAC (Université du Quebec à Chicoutimi)
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Polytechnique, Montréal, QC, Canada where he is currently a Research
Associate.
Dr. Haddadi is the lead author of the CIGRÉ technical brochure Power
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